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 Applying Professor Neil Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis, 
this Article sets out the case for according agencies primacy over courts in 
statutory interpretation; under the Article’s analysis, courts would retain an 
important, albeit secondary role. The implications of this analysis are 
significant. The Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine says that federal judges 
should defer to agency interpretations of statutes when Congress has 
delegated those agencies lawmaking authority. The comparative institutional 
analysis here suggests that Chevron’s “domain” should be expanded to 
include all interpretations promulgated by an agency’s governing board or 
director. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Neil K. Komesar has championed the notion that the 
creation and application of legal rules should generally consider the 
comparative institutional competence of different rule makers. To be 
sure, earlier judges (like Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter) and 
scholars (like Willard Hurst and Henry Hart) anticipated the broad 
contours of Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis,1 but none 
engaged in this kind of analysis with the analytical rigor that Komesar 
has accomplished.2 
In a series of legal classics, Professor Komesar makes the following 
claim: judges ought to be reluctant to develop aggressive doctrines to 
solve problems that other institutions (especially the market and 
legislatures) are handling satisfactorily, and should be particularly loathe 
to trump market or legislative rules when the judiciary is not competent 
to administer such doctrine effectively and with acceptable costs.3 As an 
economist would put it, the first prong of this analysis involves the 
“demand” function for judicial doctrine, and the second prong involves 
the “supply” function. 
On the demand side, the Komesarian question is whether another 
institution (such as the market) can provide a sufficient structure of rules 
or, stated another way, whether there are defects in the rules provided by 
these other institutions.4 Thus, most commercial law can easily and 
(according to most scholars) fairly be generated by parties to written 
contracts, and so Komesar’s analysis suggests that there is no need for 
many substantive court-generated rules of contract. Where the parties are 
not negotiating under conditions of equal knowledge and roughly equal 
 
 1. See CARL A. AUERBACH ET AL., THE LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
DECISION-MAKING BY LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, EXECUTIVE, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES (1961) (published version of the Hurst and Garrison materials, considering 
workplace injury law from the perspective of comparative institutional competence); see 
also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994) (parallel effort, but one that did not focus on a single legal problem).  
 2. For a splendid intellectual history, situating Komesar’s comparative 
institutional analysis within a broader “post legal process” framework, see Edward L. 
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). See also Edward L. Rubin, Institutional 
Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 463 (reviewing NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1994)).  
 3. See KOMESAR, supra note 2; see also Andrew Coan, Toward a 
Reality-Based Constitutional Theory, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 273 (2011). 
 4. Neil K. Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: 
Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265. 
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bargaining power, however, there is need for judicial doctrines such as 
unconscionability.5 
On the supply side, the question is whether courts are institutionally 
competent to create useful rules that are better than those that would 
govern under market conditions. Specifically, Professor Komesar 
considers the limitations of courts: judicial decision making is limited by 
the structure of adjudication, the kinds of parties who will litigate, and 
the constrained resources and limited personnel of the court system.6 
Given these limitations, Komesar is concerned that judge-made rules will 
not be satisfactory substitutes for rules or practices generated by the 
market, however defective. For example, he is skeptical that judges can 
create and administer a useful regime of unconscionability doctrine, and 
so he supports the reluctance of judges to substitute their fairness 
judgments for those in written contracts.7 
No one has rigorously applied Professor Komesar’s comparative 
institutional analysis to generate insights about statutory interpretation 
doctrine. Many scholars and judges have engaged in single institution 
analysis,8 and a handful have offered hypotheses grounded upon 
comparative institutional analysis,9 but none has engaged in a successful 
effort to apply the latter to matters of statutory interpretation. Nor has 
Komesar himself explored the implications of his theory and 
methodology for statutory interpretation doctrine and theory. This gap is 
 
 5. Id. at 283–85. 
 6. KOMESAR, supra note 2, at ch. 5; see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001) (providing a more 
detailed statement of Komesar’s supply-and-demand analysis); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial 
Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422 (2012) (providing 
further reasons, grounded upon norms of judicial practice, that constrain the capacity of 
courts to handle great quantities of cases). 
 7. Komesar, supra note 4, at 283–86. 
 8. For some outstanding examples of useful single institutional analysis, see, 
for example, JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES (1982); and Louis L. 
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239 (1955). 
 9. A number of statutory interpretation works follow a kind of comparative 
institutional analysis, though not one that is as rigorous as Komesar’s. The substantial 
consensus among such works is that administrative agencies have many comparative 
advantages vis-à-vis courts and that most statutory interpretation should be carried out by 
agencies with limited judicial review or revision. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ch. 5 (1994); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID 
HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY ch. 11 (1990); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006); 
Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–99 (1985); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice 
Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 134–41 (2000); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002), 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ils (follow “Read Content” hyperlink, select Volume 2, 
Issue 2, then select article name). 
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astounding, because comparative institutional analysis is, without 
question, a highly productive way of addressing these issues. I shall lay 
out a tentative Komesarian framework in this Article.  
I start with the proposition that comparative institutional analysis 
ought to be conducted by reference to the three purposes of a system of 
legal rules (namely, predictability, legitimacy, and efficacy). On the 
whole, such a Komesarian calculus supports an interpretive regime 
dominated by purposive agency interpretations, with courts playing a 
residual and deferential role. Doctrinally, comparative institutional 
analysis lends normative support to the strong deference to agency 
interpretations announced by the United States Supreme Court and most 
state courts. Specifically, Komesarian analysis provides a way to read the 
Court’s much-cited Chevron doctrine10 much more liberally than the 
Court itself has done and suggests the contours of a unified deference 
doctrine that is consistent with the Court’s actual behavior in the 
hundreds of statutory interpretation cases where the Justices have had an 
agency interpretation before them.11  
The comparative institutional analysis that follows departs from, or 
suggests several friendly amendments to, Professor Komesar’s theory 
and method. To begin with, I want to emphasize a cautionary point that 
such an analysis generally understates and often ignores: most of the 
generalizations needed to advance a comparative institutional analysis 
rest upon factual beliefs that are not supported by empirical data or even 
a representative array of case studies. Not only has precious little 
empirical work even been attempted, but many of the judgments required 
by comparative institutional analysis would require causal explanations 
that are not possible for many cross-institutional generalizations.12 Given 
the dearth of solid empirical work, it is disturbing that comparative 
institutional analysis of public law often rests upon confident, even 
dogmatic, factual assertions that are completely unsupported.13 Armchair 
analysis has a longstanding place in legal scholarship, but even that 
tradition ought to be cautious before relying on comparative institutional 
 
 10. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984). For the best doctrinal survey, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). 
 11. For an empirical analysis of the Court’s actual behavior in the 1014 agency 
interpretation cases it decided between 1984 and 2006, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).  
 12. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999) (expressing skepticism that empirical work 
will be able to resolve the deeply debated doctrinal and theoretical issues of statutory 
interpretation). 
 13. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041 
(2006) (book review). 
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analysis by scholars whose only experiences in government service have 
been judicial clerkships.14 
Additionally, I want to make explicit the central importance of 
including, and in fact focusing on, administrative agencies as the critical 
rule-making institution in our polity.15 This point has not been prominent 
in this field of inquiry, partly because of Professor Komesar’s own 
interests. For contract, tort, and property law, he treats the market as the 
default rule-making institution, and the question for his analysis is 
whether courts should trump market rules with judge-generated rules.16 
For constitutional law, legislatures are treated as the default rule-making 
institution, and the question for his analysis is whether courts should 
trump legislated rules with judge-generated constitutional rules.17 For 
statutory interpretation, in contrast, there are three potential default 
rule-making institutions that might compete with courts: the legislature 
itself, administrative agencies, and private institutions (including but not 
limited to the market).18 The first and third potential defaults are 
potentially significant, but I shall focus on agencies, which are easily the 
most significant.19 Hence, a critical issue for comparative institutional 
analysis is whether or under what circumstances court-generated rules 
should trump agency-generated rules. 
 
 14. Contrast the careers of institutionalist pioneers like Louis Brandeis, who 
was a brilliant lobbyist and statutory drafter as well as litigator, see generally AUERBACH 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 359–60, 812–14, and Henry Hart, who was counsel to the Office 
of Price Administration during World War II, see id. at 213 n.†, with the careers of recent 
scholars who engage in this analysis, most of whom have had no government service 
beyond a few years of clerking for federal judges. This lack of experience with 
nonjudicial institutions can cut in different directions: for some scholars, the lack of 
experience allows a romantic view of agencies while dismissing courts, e.g., VERMEULE, 
supra note 9 (urging a minimalist role for judges), while for others it fosters a romantic 
view of courts and a neglect of agencies, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (dedicated to Earl Warren and 
advancing an influential theory of representation-reinforcing judicial review). 
 15. The Symposium celebrating Professor Komesar’s work featured a panel 
(consisting of Professors Wendy Wagner, David Skeel, and me) devoted to this 
proposition, which Komesar, in remarks responding to the panel, treated as fully 
consistent with his theory. Cf., e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 90–97 (providing an 
intelligent discussion of different economic theories of “bureaucracy”); id. at 138–41 
(providing a comparative analysis of agencies versus courts with juries). 
 16. Id. at ch. 6 (tort law); Komesar, supra note 4, at 282–89 (contract and 
property law). But see KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 171–77 (comparing administrative 
management of tort reform with judicial management). 
 17. KOMESAR, supra note 2, at ch. 8. 
 18. See HURST, supra note 8, at 31–65; Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation 
in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1989). 
 19. Rubin, supra note 18; cf. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common 
Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010).  
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A final revision is the most important. In conducting such a 
comparative institutional analysis, I should like to reflect upon something 
that is less deeply discussed in Professor Komesar’s work, namely, the 
importance of normative goals. Comparative institutional analysis is 
normative: which institution, or cluster of institutions, will make the best 
rules, given the criteria for successful rules in our society or legal 
system?20 Thus, I shall frame my analysis in terms of the three 
best-accepted goals for rules in our legal system; those goals, in turn, 
generate criteria for comparing institutional capacities and performances. 
One goal of a legal system is predictability and objectivity in the 
application of rules (these are the rule of law criteria). A second is 
legitimacy. Are the rules generated by a democratic or other process that 
inspires people to follow those rules with some enthusiasm? (These are 
democracy criteria.) Third, rules have a function. Do they serve 
public-regarding functions well? (These are efficacy criteria.) 
With these goals in mind, I shall first suggest reasons why agencies 
are generally superior to courts in creating regulatory rules. Second, I 
shall apply the Komesarian calculus to suggest circumstances where 
courts might usefully trump agency rules with judge-imposed rules. 
Third, I shall consider the doctrinal ramifications of this analysis. The 
ramifications are multifarious, but I shall focus on the most obvious one, 
namely, the implications of comparative institutional analysis for 
doctrines of judicial deference to agency constructions of the statutes 
they are implementing. 
I. AGENCIES AS THE PRIMARY INSTITUTION FOR (MOST) STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
Statutory interpretation is the application of statutory texts and rules 
to particular issues or fact situations. In our polity, Congress and other 
legislatures create statutes—but many institutions interpret statutes. 
Private attorneys, corporate counsel, and associations of all kinds apply 
statutes to problems they face. Administrators and agencies interpret 
statutes all the time, as do judges and courts. Legislatures, in fact, engage 
in a fair amount of statutory interpretation: as they predict how different 
bill language will be applied in practice, as they call agencies to task for 
questionable applications, as they study the effects of statutes they have 
enacted, and as they deliberate about whether to revisit a regulatory 
arena. In short, statutory interpretation is a pervasive activity in our 
country, and many institutions make it a focal point of their energies. 
This Part consists of a series of thought experiments relating to the 
operation of a legal system in a society such as ours, specifically, a 
 
 20. KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 4–5.  
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complicated democratic society. What does such a society need in terms 
of rules and practices for interpreting statutes? I shall argue that it needs 
three things: predictability, expertise, and democratic legitimacy. I shall 
also argue that, for most rules in the modern state, it makes sense for 
agencies and not courts to create the rules applying statutes to particular 
problems and issues. In the process of justifying agency primacy, I shall 
derive guidelines for agencies when they interpret statutes. 
A. The Rule of Law: Predictability and Reliance 
As statutes are applied to new circumstances, not only do they 
require interpretation, but people and organizations need an 
“authoritative” interpreter, that is, a focal person or institution providing 
interpretations that all citizens and corporations know they are supposed 
to follow.21 It is, of course, possible for a society to follow a more 
pluralist system, as our society does for religion: each of us can choose 
which institution (denomination) to join and, hence, which dynamic 
system of rules and relationships to embrace. So on matters of morals, an 
authoritative interpreter, whose views are binding on all of us, is neither 
necessary nor desirable. But on a host of other matters, we want and need 
an authoritative interpreter.  
Consider this example. There are several public parks, where 
children play and where adults read, visit with one another, and walk 
their dogs. After several accidents involving motorcycles and 
motorscooters, the city council enacts a statute: “no vehicles are allowed 
in public parks.” Does that statute prohibit bicycles? Users of the park 
will have many different views about whether the statute bars bicycles: 
kids and some parents will think it obviously does not; many older park 
users and parents of toddlers will think that it obviously does; and other 
park users will have a variety of views, including the view that the law is 
completely ambiguous on this matter. There is a public need for an 
interpretation that binds everyone; if you do not like that interpretation, 
you can petition the city council to amend or even repeal the statute.  
Consider some traditional rule of law virtues that should accompany 
the process of statutory interpretation (whatever the ultimate application 
to bicycles).22 The process ought to be neutral and objective: the 
 
 21. There might be more than one authoritative interpreter. In a family, for 
example, Mom and Dad might both be authoritative interpreters of family rules; in most 
cases, the first parent to lay down a rule is the primary decision maker, to which the other 
parent defers. Decision-making cycles (where Mom lays down one rule, Dad trumps it or 
provides a slightly different rule, Mom creates an exception, etc.) are widely considered 
nonproductive in our society.  
 22. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (classically 
advancing the desiderata for procedural justice).  
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interpreter comes up with a rule applicable to everyone (no exceptions 
for special interests) that is derived from the statutory command through 
a rational process that even someone harmed by the interpretation (i.e., 
bike riders) can appreciate. From a rule of law perspective, it would be 
useful if the process involved public deliberation, where different 
perspectives are argued and reasons given for the interpretation. It would 
be terrific if the result were reasonably predictable, that is, different 
decision makers following the relevant criteria will usually reach the 
same result. And it would be good if the interpretation were stable; 
parents and older park users can rely on the bicycle ban when they make 
plans to arrange a play date or a meeting in the park. 
The no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical originated in the published 
version of H.L.A. Hart’s Holmes Lectures, and Professor Hart assumed 
that courts would provide the interpretations called for by the variations 
in possible “vehicles.”23 Under a single-institution analysis, courts would 
seem well-suited to provide objective, neutral, reasoned, and predictable 
interpretations of that statute. If the local courts follow the federal model, 
trial judges are expected to listen carefully to arguments on all sides and 
to provide reasons for their statutory constructions. If the judge has life 
tenure, she is likely to be independent of the political process and more 
attentive to objective considerations in her opinion, which is reviewable 
on appeal. If an appeals court construed the statute to be inapplicable to 
bicycles, park users could rely on that construction, for trial judges 
would be absolutely bound by it and even a differently constituted 
appeals court would follow the precedent as a matter of stare decisis. 
These are powerful rule of law advantages for making an 
independent judiciary the primary organ for statutory interpretation. Yet 
under a Komesarian comparative institutional analysis, one can readily 
understand how even this classic “judges know best” statute is (and 
should be) primarily interpreted by administrators and not by judges. 
Indeed, the police and prosecutors are, in practice, the dominant 
interpreters, because they make the initial decisions as to the statute’s 
application. If the police or the prosecutor interprets the law to allow 
bicycles in the park, then there will be no case for a judge to offer her 
interpretation. Even if the police interpret the law to exclude bicycles, 
they might enforce their understanding through signs, friendly 
persuasion, and warnings that, likewise, are not likely to generate court 
cases (and, with such cases, judicial constructions of the statute). The 
result is that courts may have no opportunity even to interpret the statute 
 
 23. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 593, 607–11 (1958). See also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and the Fidelity to Law—
A Response to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958) (responding to Hart 
and also focusing on application of the no-vehicles hypothetical). 
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and, if they do get a case now and then, may not develop a systematic 
array of rules. This feature of judicial decision making is an important 
limitation on the ability of judges to deliver a comprehensive regulatory 
regime.24 
This thought experiment can be generalized at the national level. 
From a rule of law perspective, the big advantage of federal agencies is 
that they have the capacity, and often the legislative mandate, to generate 
a lot of detailed rules expeditiously and to publicize those rules as 
binding upon the entire nation.25 Case-by-case adjudication, which is the 
characteristic mode for courts, takes longer to generate rules, especially 
national rules binding on everyone. In contrast, agencies have a variety 
of mechanisms that allow them to generate national rules relatively 
quickly: administrative rulemaking, published guidances, handbooks, 
and even online websites.26 These are more accessible to the general 
public than judicial precedents are, they have immediate national 
application, and they are more detailed (sometimes much more detailed) 
than precedents usually are or can aspire to be. 
Potential drawbacks of police and prosecutor interpretation are that 
it might not be transparent to the community and might vacillate, as 
different officers could bring different viewpoints to the enforcement 
process. In that event, however, the best solution, from a Komesarian 
point of view, would be for the police department and the prosecutor’s 
office to cooperate in publishing guidelines for use of the parks; such 
guidelines could be posted at various points in the park and could advise 
park users that they can ride tricycles but not bicycles in the park, and 
they can roller-skate if they choose. Indeed, the best rule of law solution 
would be for the City Council to authorize the Parks Commission to 
promulgate rules, after public notice and a hearing open to all, setting 
forth the rules for park use (including the no-vehicles command). 27 
To be sure, any police-prosecutor guideline or commission rule 
might be subject to potential judicial review in those cases where 
someone was fined for a violation. As before, however, there would 
likely be no judicial review of administrative decisions to allow 
 
 24. Cf. KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 136–38 (considering the lawmaking effects 
of skewed participation by citizens in the adjudicative process).  
 25. This argument originates with Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases 
per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial 
Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1124 (1987).  
 26. On the variety of mechanisms available to agencies, see M. Elizabeth 
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386–90 (2004); 
Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468–73 (1992).  
 27. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing that the rule of lenity should be replaced by public 
rulemaking by prosecutors, with judicial review of rules interpreting criminal statutes).  
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mechanisms like tricycles into the park. Nor would any but a handful of 
accused vehicle-riders press their arguments in court, because of the 
expense and bother.28 And if a litigious cyclist did press her case before a 
judge, it is probable that the judge will “go along” with the police and 
prosecutor in most cases—for reasons that I shall explain below. 
The foregoing thought experiment (the “Case of the Vehicles in the 
Park”) also suggests important guidelines for agencies to follow when 
interpreting statutes. The most obvious guideline is procedural: agencies 
can be most helpful if they promulgate a coherent set of rules in a format 
easily available to the public affected by the rules. For our no-vehicles 
statute, for example, the police department or the parks commission 
could generate a list of “allowed” and “not allowed” mechanisms and 
post the list on park landmarks, the park website, and in a little handbook 
or plastic card people could carry home. Complicated federal statutes 
might be interpreted through postings in the Federal Register.  
Substantively, agencies, like any other interpreters, must interpret 
statutes with close attention to the statutory language, declining to give 
the words a meaning they will not bear. Thus, the agency might choose 
to apply the no-vehicles law to include bicycles in the statutory bar; 
bicycles are frequently deemed to be vehicles, and so this is a 
permissible application (though the opposite reading, excluding bicycles 
from the law, may also be permissible). I am more dubious that an 
agency could, consistent with the rule of law, apply the statute to cover 
roller skates, toy cars, or pogo sticks. All of these mechanisms might 
meet the dictionary definition of “vehicle,” but the average person would 
probably not consider a no-vehicles ban to cover toys of this sort.29 
B. Public Good: Agency Expertise  
As a general matter, statutes are adopted for a public purpose, and 
we usually assume that legitimate public purposes are instrumental and 
not purely expressive or moralistic. The no-vehicles law may have been 
adopted in part for moralistic reasons (to disapprove of vehicle-operating 
persons), but such a statute would surely also have been publicly justified 
by an instrumental goal, such as improving the safety of parks and 
preventing harm to vulnerable persons in the parks (i.e., children and 
older persons). Federal super-statutes carry out the greatest goals of our 
legal system, such as outlawing irrational and prejudice-based workplace 
 
 28. How many of the tens of millions of speeding tickets are challenged in 
court? Speeding tickets in many jurisdictions carry a higher penalty (hundreds of dollars) 
than would the no-vehicles law.  
 29. Cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (finding that an airplane is 
not a “motorized vehicle” as used in a federal statute barring the use of such vehicles). 
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discrimination, preventing environmental degradation, preserving a 
healthy and integrated system of public and private finance, and 
responding to international terrorism.30  
Because statutes are purposive, and society potentially benefits from 
purposive laws, interpreters of all sorts are urged to apply statutes so as 
to advance rather than detract from the public-regarding statutory 
purpose.31 In addition to following statutory texts, agencies, like judges, 
ought to apply statutory text in light of legislative purpose(s). An 
interpretation that undermines the statute’s efficacy is one that should be 
avoided, if possible. The question for the comparative institutional 
analyst is this: Do agencies have an advantage over courts in interpreting 
statutes to carry out their purposes?  
The conventional wisdom is that agencies have greater “expertise” 
than courts in figuring out instrumental applications.32 One source of 
agency expertise comes from specialization: agency officials spend their 
time focusing on a particular set of problems, they are better at solving 
those problems than judges would be because they have thought about 
them more, they have seen what works and what does not work, and they 
are sharply aware of the practical trade-offs that are needed given scarce 
resources for implementation. Interpreting our no-vehicles law, many 
judges would find that bicycles are included in the plain meaning of the 
statute—but the police and prosecutors are likely to write such an 
application out of the law entirely if their experience reveals that bicycles 
do not contribute to accidents harming park users. Contrariwise, if the 
police perceive bicycles to be the main cause of injury to park users, they 
will apply the statute, even though many judges would not. If it is true, as 
Justice Antonin Scalia has recently argued, that the comparative 
advantage of courts is rigorous textual analysis, then judicial 
interpretation of something like the no-vehicles law will often miss the 
right purpose-based analysis, such as the application of the statute to 
bicycles if the police observe them to cause accidents or pose other 
dangers to park users.33  
Not only do agency personnel develop expertise by gaining 
experience from their focus on particular problems, as in our no-vehicles 
 
 30. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (providing a theory of super-statutes and 
examples such as those described in text).  
 31. E.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 1, at 1377–80; ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 63–65 (2012).  
 32. Like most “conventional wisdom,” that in the text is not supported by 
empirical evidence, and so it must be taken with a grain of salt.  
 33. E.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 36–39 (providing a rigorous 
application of judicial reasoning, ending with the confident but hard-to-defend assertion 
that a no-vehicles law could never apply to bicycles).  
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example, but agencies today usually include staff who have special 
training in economic analysis, often critically important for a reliable 
means-end analysis. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is charged with enforcing antifraud rules against 
persons and companies engaged in the purchase and sale of corporate 
securities. To carry out its mission, the SEC has assembled a staff of 
economists and lawyers with training in economics to figure out what 
kinds of rules work best to head off as well as detect securities fraud.34 
Many a single-institution analysis takes the SEC to task for not doing a 
better job at detecting such fraud, such as the notorious Madoff Ponzi 
scheme,35 but almost no one has argued that judges would do a better job 
interpreting the statutes than the SEC has done. Indeed, the main 
criticism of the SEC has been that it remains too much dominated by 
lawyers and ought to rely more than it does on the advice of economists, 
a lesson the agency has already taken to heart.36  
The SEC is an independent agency, outside the formal control of the 
President.37 Executive branch agencies, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), are staffed with experts in their fields of 
regulation (such as scientists in the EPA), but have an added layer of 
expertise imposed upon them by the President, namely, the cost-benefit 
analysis of their significant rulemaking by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).38 Staffed with economists and other experts, 
OIRA requires agencies to justify their instrumental regulations through 
a rigorous cost-benefit analysis, which OIRA’s experts then review to 
determine whether the regulatory rules are needed to generate benefits 
consistent with the statutory goals.39 By all accounts, OIRA requires 
agencies to adjust their rules to respond to cost-benefit concerns. 
 
 34. E.g., Bruce R. Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2013) (detailed description and 
defense of SEC’s economic analysis, and responding to judicial critics of that analysis).  
 35. Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (2010).  
 36. Compare id. (criticizing the SEC as too lawyer-driven and urging more 
reliance on economic analysis), with Kraus & Raso, supra note 34 (reporting more 
staffing and greater reliance on economists by the SEC).  
 37. Or so the Supreme Court has assumed. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 
130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010) (making this assumption, based upon the parties’ 
stipulation). 
 38. For an overview of OIRA review, see, for example, Nicholas Bagley & 
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1260 (2006); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 
50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998).  
 39. Croley, supra note 38, at 841–43. 
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Again, one can criticize OIRA’s instrumental analysis, both 
generally and in particular cases, but a comparative institutional analysis 
asks whether courts could accomplish this means-end analysis as well or 
better than OIRA and the relevant agencies. Everyone has her own list of 
federal agencies that underperform—but virtually no one advocates 
abolition of the agency and transfer of its duties to courts.40 In the 
modern regulatory state, courts are just not up to the task of instrumental, 
purposive analysis. Courts’ decision makers (judges) are lawyers, 
typically with little training in economics or science; the supporting staff 
(law clerks) are smart and somewhat better trained in economics and 
science but are short-term employees whose time is swallowed up with 
the minutiae of legal research and fact-checking; and the case-by-case 
mode of decision making is not well-suited to the kind of systematic 
rulemaking that the regulatory state needs to accomplish. 
C. Legitimacy: Democratic Accountability 
A third important criterion for a system of legal rules is that the 
directives governing the citizenry are legitimate: they are adopted 
through a process that the society recognizes as the valid mechanism for 
generating rules applicable to all its members. At the national level, our 
primary rule of recognition is Article I, Section 7: when both chambers 
of Congress agree on particular language and the President signs on (or is 
overridden), a statute is created that is binding on judges and, by 
implication, on citizens and anyone within the nation’s jurisdiction as 
well.41 The most notable thing about Article I, Section 7 is the electoral 
connection; each institution (the House of Representatives, the Senate, 
and the Presidency) is elected by a different kind of constituency, and 
each is accountable to that constituency when its members make 
important policy choices.42 Stated another way, when Congress enacts 
statutes, often after an intensely divisive political debate, those statutes 
create new settled rules that even the losers accept as legitimate, even if 
unwise.43 
 
 40. Professor Jerry Mashaw, for example, is a critic of the regulatory efforts of 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), but his classic analysis of 
auto safety concludes that judicial review only made regulatory dysfunction worse. See 
MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 9, at 225.  
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (process for creating federal statutes); id. at art. VI 
(the Supremacy Clause, requiring state judges to follow federal statutes).  
 42. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 
(1999); V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835 
(2004).  
 43. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10 (1999).  
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Under these foundational principles of democratic accountability, it 
stands to reason that the statutory interpreter ought to be responsive to 
the legislative process that created the statute. An interpretation that is 
consistent with legislative expectations is to be preferred to one that is 
not, all else being equal. Admittedly, this proposition has generated some 
controversy, but almost all the objectors are Justice Scalia and his former 
law clerks, the advocates of the new textualism. The new textualists 
object that legislative “intent” is a worthless fiction and that, even if not 
fictive, such intent cannot be discovered by courts.44 The first objection 
seems to be erroneous; political scientists and linguists are largely in 
agreement that collective legislative intent is both conceivable and 
frequently achieved in the process of enacting statutes.45 
As a matter of comparative institutional analysis, the new 
textualists’ second argument suggests the possibility that agencies might 
have access to the insights of legislative history and, hence, serve as 
more legitimate interpreters of statutes than courts. As to this question, 
there is virtually no empirical evidence one way or the other, but there is 
good reason to believe that agencies have a comparative advantage in 
this respect as well. Return to our no-vehicles thought experiment. 
When the (hypothetical) City Council was considering bills to bar 
vehicles from municipal parks, it is quite likely that police and 
prosecutors were an active part of the process. If the police department 
had told the Council that there was no problem with any kind of vehicles, 
there would likely have been no legislation. Conversely, if the police had 
reported a lot of accidents resulting from motorcycles zipping through 
the park, the Council would probably have taken their recommendations 
very seriously. The point is that agencies are, relatively speaking, more 
knowledgeable about the legislative debates, deals, and understandings 
behind an enacted statute. If the judge is appointed for life (the federal 
model for the judiciary), she will probably be much more of a stranger to 
the statute than the administrators are. 
Moreover, the administrators are probably more knowledgeable 
about the ongoing legislative history of the statute than judges are. For 
 
 44. E.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 31, at 375–87 (arguing that legislative 
“intent” is a worthless fiction, that legislative materials are unreliable evidence of any 
conceivable intent, and that treating materials generated by legislative subgroups as 
“authoritative” raises separation of powers concerns); John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997). 
 45. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION 82–119 (2010); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on 
Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 41–56 (1994); Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, 
the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119 
(2011) (responding to separation of powers arguments for excluding legislative history 
and, indeed, turning those arguments around to favor legislative history).  
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example, the police and the councilmembers might have originally 
focused on motor vehicles, rather than bicycles and the like, but in the 
wake of the statute the police do notice accidents involving bicycles. 
Knowing that the statute does not include bicycles, the police might 
petition the Council to amend the law to add bicycles. Because many 
parents and kids want the park to be bicycle-accessible and parent groups 
suggest regulatory alternatives such as special bicycle paths, the Council 
might decline the police proposal but adopt, instead, a law requiring 
bicycles to be ridden in parks only on designated paths. The police know 
not to enforce the no-vehicles law against bicycles under such 
circumstances. 
The conclusions inspired by this thought experiment can probably 
be generalized to the federal level. Although there is no empirical 
evidence, I have read all the briefs filed by the Solicitor General 
supporting an agency statutory interpretation in hundreds of Supreme 
Court cases between 1984 and 2006. Upon reading these cases, my 
judgment is that the agency briefs were, virtually without exception, 
most useful discussions of legislative history, and that executive 
department lawyers were skilled and relatively scrupulous in discovering 
and analyzing legislative history.46 To be sure, agency briefs are 
advocacy documents in cases where the United States is a party, but 
scholars have been impressed that the Solicitor General subjects agency 
interpretations to stringent review and presents an unusually good 
analysis.47 Moreover, contrary to the new textualists, I find Supreme 
Court analysis of legislative materials to be highly sophisticated and 
useful treatments of legislative history.48 
Aside from their typical advantage in access to legislative materials, 
there is a deeper reason why agencies will be more responsive to 
legislative expectations than courts will be: legislators communicate 
constantly with agencies and sometimes send them signals when their 
significant interpretations are off track.49 While communications from 
the current Congress do not necessarily establish the intent of the 
enacting Congress (especially if the statute was enacted long ago), an 
interpretation consistent with current congressional preferences is, 
 
 46. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1196–98. 
 47. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator 
between Court and Agency, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185. 
 48. Eskridge, supra note 13, at 2065–70 (responding to the argument that 
judges are experts at textual interpretation and incompetent or sneaky in using legislative 
history).  
 49. E.g., Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 
(1984); Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 
119 YALE L.J. 2096, 2105 (2010).  
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relatively speaking, more democratically legitimate than an interpretation 
that is not. 
Likewise, federal agencies are more responsive than courts to the 
policy preferences of the President, who along with the Vice President is 
our only nationally elected official. Executive branch agencies are 
potentially more responsive; their heads are appointed and can be 
removed by the President, and much of their interpretive work is 
reviewable by OIRA.50 Even “independent” agencies are subject to 
presidential preferences, though to a lesser extent: their heads are 
appointed by the President, their budgets are prepared by the Office of 
Management and Budget, and the United States Department of Justice 
(an executive agency) controls their litigation decisions on appeal.51 The 
comparative institutional point is this: compared with courts, one reason 
agencies are more competent to make big “political” decisions (legally 
debatable decisions with important policy consequences) is that agencies 
are accountable to democratic institutions and popular participation in 
ways that unelected, life-tenured federal judges are not.52 
The foregoing analysis has important consequences for the process 
an agency should follow when interpreting federal statutes. Recall my 
earlier point, that agencies should be attentive to the statutory text, read 
in light of the statutory purpose (the agency’s mission). In conducting 
this analysis, the agency should also consider the ongoing legislative 
history of the statute. Moreover, when the agency is making a “big 
move” addressing an important, unresolved issue, it is incumbent upon 
the agency to engage in an open, deliberative, and democratically 
accountable process, including but not limited to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.53 
 
 50. Mashaw, supra note 9; see also Croley, supra note 38, at 827–28; Lipton, 
supra note 49, at 2105–06. 
 51. See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an 
Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 287–92 (1993) (describing 
the ways in which the Department of Justice has dominated legal decision making by the 
EEOC, ostensibly an “independent” agency).  
 52. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865–66 (1984) (offering accountability to the President as an important reason for 
deferring to agency decisions where Congress has not directly addressed an issue in the 
statute).  
 53. Compare HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC 
REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 219–20, 251 (2002) (notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is the best solution to the administrative state’s possible democracy deficit), 
with Lipton, supra note 49, at 2114–15 (quoting E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing 
Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992)) (arguing that agency responsiveness 
owes more to informal interactions with We the People than to the Kabuki-like dance of 
rulemaking).  
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II. THE (POTENTIAL) UMPIREAL ROLE FOR COURTS 
Under a Komesarian comparative institutional analysis, tied to the 
goals of our legal system, statutory interpretation is better carried out by 
agencies than by courts—which is pretty much the system we have in 
this country. The conclusions reached in the previous Part support the 
status quo and suggest, moreover, the best interpretive approach agencies 
should generally follow in light of the normative commitments 
underlying our legal system: read statutes broadly, in light of their 
purposes, and follow a quasi-legislative political process for 
interpretations addressing big policy questions or arenas not resolved by 
the statute.54 
To be sure, some federal statutes seem to delegate the primary 
responsibility for statutory interpretation to courts, with agencies allotted 
a secondary role. Surprisingly, Komesarian analysis may often trump this 
form of legislative choice among institutions. Like state and local 
legislatures, Congress has vested the interpretation of criminal laws with 
the judiciary, but as we have seen in the Case of the Vehicles in the Park 
even those statutes are dominated by administrative interpretation, as a 
practical matter. An even more dramatic example is the Sherman Act of 
1890, the antitrust super-statute that vests prosecutorial authority in the 
Department of Justice but also authorizes private lawsuits and renders 
federal courts the primary decision makers for policy issues presented by 
the broadly worded law.55 In practice, however, the Supreme Court has 
faithfully (almost slavishly) followed the Department of Justice’s advice 
in prioritizing the disparate purposes of the original law, setting forth 
both per se and flexible prohibitions of specified anticompetitive 
conduct, and jettisoning judicial precedents right and left.56 This example 
illustrates the power of Komesarian comparative institutional analysis: 
even when Congress sets the court-agency balance in favor of judicial 
primacy in statutory interpretation, the agency may still acquire primacy 
where its expertise dominates that of the Court and its interpretations 
strike the Court as not in conflict with the democratic expectations of the 
political branches.  
 
 54. This is roughly the process most agencies follow when interpreting statutes. 
E.g., Lipton, supra note 49, at 2112–13; Mashaw, supra note 9. 
 55. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 190, ch. 647, §§ 1–8, 26 Stat. 
209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
 56. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 30, at 120–64 (presenting an 
institutional history of the Sherman Act and demonstrating the dominance of the 
Department of Justice in setting antitrust policy, followed by the judiciary); Leah 
Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 
2007, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2007, at 3, 17–20 (empirical evidence 
demonstrating the complete dominance of the Department of Justice in setting antitrust 
policy and persuading the judiciary, 1967–2006).  
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The foregoing analysis, and especially the dramatic example of 
agency dominance in the construction of national antitrust policy, raise 
these Komesarian questions: Ought courts, as a matter of institutional 
capability, be considered obsolete institutions in the modern regulatory 
state? Do they have any role to play in the modern legal system?  
For some statutory schemes, courts do approach irrelevance, as for 
those statutes where Congress has delegated all effective interpretation to 
various agencies and nothing to judges.57 A surprisingly large number of 
statutes are what Edward Rubin calls “intransitive” laws, where 
congressional directives are addressed to agencies and administrators, 
and not to the citizenry and judges.58 David Skeel’s contribution to this 
Symposium illustrates the importance of intransitive statutes during the 
financial crisis of 2008–09: the overwhelming majority of the statutory 
directives were addressed to regulatory agencies, and the federal courts 
were, by design as well as by their own abstention, virtually irrelevant to 
the construction of the statutes that formed the foundation of the nation’s 
regulatory response to the crisis.59  
But a central lesson of comparative institutional analysis is that, 
however superior one institution may appear to another, the “superior” 
institution has its Achilles heels and the “inferior” institution has some 
formidable strengths that might correct for the weaknesses of the 
superior institution. So it appears to be with agencies and courts. Even if, 
in the general run of statutory issues, agencies seem like the best 
institution to make rules, there may be particular issues where courts are 
the best institution to make certain judgments. More important, the 
undemocratic, unexpert but predictable (even plodding) judiciary might 
be the best institution of all to monitor certain kinds of agency 
dysfunctions, including those reflecting an agency’s “minoritarian bias” 
in favor of its specialized perspective or that of its client groups, as well 
as poor decisions flowing from an agency’s “majoritarian biases” that 
impose unfair costs upon minorities.60  
In short, a proper comparative institutional analysis would not read 
federal courts out of the business of statutory interpretation. Indeed, the 
Komesarian perspective helps us appreciate the richness of the 
 
 57. Even in such statutes, of course, courts remain open for lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of statutory provisions or their implementation, see 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), but such lawsuits rarely have much traction.  
 58. Rubin, supra note 18, at 381–83.  
 59. David A. Skeel, Jr., Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis, 2013 WIS. 
L. REV. 629. 
 60. These terms are taken from Imperfect Alternatives. KOMESAR, supra note 2, 
at 54, 75–81; see also id. at 216–31 (detailed examination of the Framers’ approach to 
minoritarian and, especially, majoritarian biases as well as the relevance of this analysis 
to recent theories of judicial review by Bruce Ackerman and John Hart Ely).  
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sometimes-denigrated “umpireal” role61 of judges. Their independence 
from politics and the slenderness of their resources render the judiciary 
not only the “least dangerous” branch,62 but the only branch of 
government that can be trusted to maintain boundaries needed for the 
rule of law, and perhaps also democracy, to flourish. Although Professor 
Komesar himself has emphasized the judiciary’s comparative advantage 
in monitoring majoritarian biases,63 this Part will argue that courts have 
other comparative advantages as well. Specifically, judicial review is 
institutionally defensible when (1) agencies are in potential conflict with 
state regulations, (2) agencies shirk their rule of law duties revealed by 
clear statutory texts upon which private and public institutions have 
relied, and (3) agencies contravene important public values. Consistent 
with Komesar’s approach in the constitutional arena, my analysis 
envisions a more aggressive role of courts to counteract the majoritarian 
biases of agencies and accepts that courts cannot as a practical matter 
play a very effective direct role in monitoring minoritarian biases such as 
capture by special interests.  
A. Intergovernmental Disputes 
Perhaps the least-appreciated role of federal judges is boundary 
maintenance, namely, enforcing prescribed boundaries or limits on 
officials.64 The Komesarian reasons for preferring agencies as 
rule-making institutions do not completely apply when agencies (or 
agencies and other political institutions) are in conflict, which is typical 
in boundary maintenance disputes.  
For the best example, consider cases where the issue is whether a 
federal statute preempts a state or local rule. Much of the Supreme 
Court’s docket is occupied by such cases, and almost all of them call 
forth a federal agency brief, as well as briefs from state and local 
agencies or their litigation surrogates.65 In more than two-thirds of the 
Supreme Court cases, federal agencies take the position that state or local 
 
 61. For a discussion of the umpireal role of judges, see Marvin E. Frankel, The 
Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). 
 62. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392–94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills 
ed., 1982) (describing the judicial branch as the “least dangerous to the political rights of 
the constitution”). 
 63. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 134–38, 213–31.  
 64. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The 
Uneasy Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1006 (1987) (sophisticated analysis of the role of judicial review in policing the 
“boundary” between the public and private spheres).  
 65. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441 (2008) (reporting and analyzing 131 Supreme Court cases involving 
preemption claims with federal agency inputs through amicus briefs, 1984 to 2006).  
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rules are preempted by national statutes.66 Although such agencies do 
consider concerns raised by state and local governments, they do not 
appear to be perfectly constrained by such pressures, which are 
counterbalanced by agency tendencies to consider their own missions 
superior to state and local projects.67 The leading scholars have cautioned 
that federal agencies tend to seek expanded jurisdiction and authority, 
which motivates them to grab turf from state and local authorities.68 
On the demand side, therefore, one can see a strong need for 
institutional mediation of such important disputes. On the supply side, 
the Komesarian question is whether these preemption issues are ones that 
the Supreme Court is well equipped to handle. This is a question worth 
extended discussion and requiring more evidence, but the existing 
evidence supports a judicial role in these cases. That the Court is largely 
independent of politics renders it the best national institution to handle 
such disputes, for the Justices’ independence gives some assurance to 
state and local governments that their arguments will be taken seriously. 
To be sure, any national institution is likely to favor national interests 
much of the time, but the Supreme Court has an impressively neutral 
track record in preemption cases, from the perspective of state and local 
governments. The Court protects state and local rules against preemption 
in 47.3% of the cases that it hears, finds preemption in 45.8% of the 
cases, and rules both for and against state law in 6.9% of the cases.69  
Consider a recent and highly controversial preemption case, Arizona 
v. United States.70 Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement 
and Safe Neighborhoods Act, the purpose of which was to “discourage 
and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic 
activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”71 To carry 
out this purpose, Arizona made it a crime for a noncitizen to be 
noncompliant with federal alien-registration requirements (section 3)72 or 
 
 66. Id. at 1479 tbl.2 (reporting that in the Court’s preemption cases where a 
federal agency took a position, the agency in 70.2% of the cases favored preemption of 
state law).  
 67. Nina Mendelsohn, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 
(2004).  
 68. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 209–11 (2004); Mendelsohn, supra note 67, at  
794–97.  
 69. Eskridge, supra note 65, at 1484, app. (reporting the results in the 131 
preemption cases decided by the Court, 1984–2006, and having agency inputs).  
 70. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 71. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, § 1, 
2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11-1051 (2012)). 
 72. § 3. 
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to seek or engage in work in Arizona (section 5).73 Section 6 authorized 
state and local officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer 
has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that 
makes the person removable from the United States.”74 Section 2(B) 
required officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to make efforts, 
in some circumstances, to verify the person’s immigration status with the 
federal government.75 
Few issues are as divisive as state efforts to buttress federal 
immigration enforcement. States like Arizona believed the federal 
executive department was not enforcing immigration laws in any 
meaningful sense and sought to add their incentives and officials to 
strengthen enforcement. The Obama administration took the position that 
such state laws unhinge the careful balance set in recent immigration 
statutes. The Supreme Court ruled that sections 3, 5, and 6 of the Arizona 
law were preempted by federal immigration statutes, but that section 
2(B) was not, on its face, preempted but might be vulnerable to 
challenges as it is applied by the state and local authorities.76 Authored 
by Justice Anthony Kennedy, a Reagan appointee, and joined by Chief 
Justice John Roberts (appointed by President George W. Bush) and 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor 
(appointed by Democrats),77 the opinion for the Court represented a 
bipartisan consensus judgment that seemed impossible for any of the 
political branches to achieve in 2012.78 
Also important, the dissenting opinions were of high quality. 
Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito reflected different but 
impressively judicious judgments about the balance between federal and 
state law in the field of immigration.79 Although Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion contained a fair amount of intemperate rhetoric, the 
bulk of it was sophisticated legal analysis supporting a broad role for the 
states to police their own borders and to discourage illegal aliens from 
remaining within their jurisdictions.80 All eight participating Justices, in 
 
 73. § 5(C).  
 74. § 6(A). 
 75. § 2(B). 
 76. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 77. Id. at 2497; LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 295 
tbl.4-1 (5th ed. 2012). 
 78. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Boehner, American Hero, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
6, 2013, at SR6; Editorial, Provisional Government, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2013, at A14; 
Janet Hook & Carol E. Lee, Cliff Talks Down to the Wire—Both Sides to Meet at White 
House Today; Any Deal Is Likely to Be Limited, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012, at A1. 
 79. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2522–24 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 2524 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 80. Id. at 2511–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(offering hard-hitting and high-quality legal and constitutional analysis supporting 
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my opinion, engaged in a judicious debate about the legality of state 
action on a politicized issue pitting federal agencies against state and 
local legislatures, governors, and law enforcement agencies. Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court settled the matter about as well as any 
judgment could have done—and this is significant evidence of the utility 
of the federal courts in resolving intergovernmental disputes between 
national agencies and state or local governments.  
To be sure, most intergovernmental disputes at the national level 
will not be settled by the federal courts; more efficient mechanisms for 
dispute resolution outside the preemption context exist within the 
executive branch of the federal government. For example, disputes 
among federal agencies (surprisingly common) are generally settled by 
OIRA, by the Solicitor General, or even by the White House, rather than 
by the judiciary.81 Not as common as national-state disputes, but 
potentially even more important, are disputes between the political 
branches of the federal government, namely, the President (or agencies 
under the President) versus Congress. Perhaps surprisingly, most of those 
disputes involve matters of statutory as well as constitutional 
interpretation, and the Supreme Court has proven to be an honest arbiter 
of such disputes.82  
B. Agency Shirking 
One of the most important Komesarian insights is that comparative 
institutional analysis must avoid the tendency to romanticize institutions. 
Even if I am right that agencies have many advantages over courts in 
making rules, we still need to think hard about what dysfunctions might 
afflict agency rulemaking before concluding that courts should play a 
 
Arizona’s position). But cf. id. at 2521–22 (injudicious rhetoric assailing the Obama 
administration for its amnesty program for children of illegal aliens, a program not 
strictly relevant to the legal issues in the appeal).  
 81. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 38 (OIRA); Lemos, supra note 47 
(Solicitor General).  
 82. The Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel 
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952), initiated this pas de deux between constitutional and 
statutory limits, as most such disputes fall within the “zone of twilight,” where the 
dispute rests upon presidential claims that Congress has authorized presidential 
initiatives. See id. at 634–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). For recent examples, see Medellin 
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Even 
Morrison, which most scholars believe to have been poorly reasoned, represented the 
effective operation of the Court as a neutral decision maker; the author of the 
pro-Congress opinion was Chief Justice William Rehnquist, a former executive branch 
official and never a Justice to go out of his way to undermine presidential authority. See 
id. at 659; Philip P. Frickey, Transcending the Routine: Methodology and Constitutional 
Values in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Statutory Cases, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 266, 
276–77 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006). 
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secondary (or even tertiary) role in statutory interpretation. A generation 
ago, many law professors took as axiomatic the idea that most agencies 
were “captured” by the interest groups they were charged with 
regulating, and that agency capture justified a highly skeptical judicial 
review of agency rules.83 In Komesarian terminology, captured agencies 
reflected minoritarian biases, where administrators or an interest group 
pressed statutory policy away from the public interest favored by the 
majority. Today, agency capture theory has lost most of its bite,84 but 
virtually anyone who has had experience in actual administration agrees 
that even well-motivated agencies engage in what economists would call 
“shirking,” namely, departing from the (majoritarian) agenda set for the 
agency by Congress. 
In this Part, I consider different ways agencies might shirk—with 
each kind of shirking behavior tied to the goals of a legal system of rules. 
Thus, an agency may shirk by ignoring established legal limits on their 
authority. Such rule-of-law shirking is especially problematic when 
persons and firms have widely relied on those limits. An agency can also 
engage in democratic shirking, where it expands (or constricts) statutes 
so much that it usurps Congress’s authority and without the 
accountability felt by legislators. Finally, agencies engage in policy 
shirking when they fail to pursue the congressional goals effectively, 
perhaps because of interest group capture or simply because of lethargy 
and inertia.  
Each kind of shirking calls upon the comparative institutional 
analyst to consider institutional checks, such as judicial review of agency 
interpretations. Under Komesar’s theory, however, such a move requires 
a belief that the checking institution (i.e., the judiciary) can accurately 
detect shirking and remedy it without creating excessive costs. For 
structural reasons, the judiciary is not as clearly capable of monitoring 
agency decisions to correct for minoritarian biases as for interagency 
disputes and for majoritarian bias. Because courts are both independent 
and skilled analysts of the legislative deals encoded in statutory 
language, I believe they do a good job monitoring rule-of-law shirking, 
and their role is highly valuable for institutions and persons who have 
relied on the rule of law the agency has ignored. A comparative 
institutional analysis is less supportive of judicial capacity to monitor 
democratic and policy shirking, but not entirely negative, either. In what 
 
 83. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic 
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14–15 (1984) (suggesting that many statutes are rent seeking 
and that courts ought to interpret them narrowly); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682–90 (1975).  
 84. See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making 
Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
245, 260 (1998).  
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follows, I shall lay out the agency problem and some thoughts as to 
whether courts would be appropriate monitoring institutions.  
1. RULE-OF-LAW SHIRKING: PROTECTING RELIANCE INTERESTS 
As suggested by my earlier analysis, agencies interpret statutes 
purposively, and that is on the whole a good impulse in the modern 
regulatory state. A consequence of a purposivist approach to statutes is 
that the interpreter will read the statute dynamically, to reach beyond the 
original problems that were the basis of congressional deliberation.85 
Again, this is not only natural for agencies, but often or even typically 
beneficial for the public interest. But what if the agency presses statutory 
policy beyond the established meaning of the statute, a meaning that has 
generated reliance interests? This represents the agency shirking its rule 
of law duties. (If there has been no reliance on the statute, the agency’s 
dynamism might technically violate rule of law norms, but the violation 
would tend to be harmless error.)  
One might expect agencies to engage in this kind of rule-of-law 
shirking rather frequently, because administrators can get caught up in 
the normative bounce that comes from aggressively pursuing the 
agency’s mission and because the political process is as likely to 
encourage as to halt agency dynamism. If agencies shirk their rule of law 
duties and undermine reliance interests, the Komesarian question is 
whether the judiciary is an appropriate institution to correct this kind of 
shirking. I believe the answer to that is “yes,” though there is no 
systematic empirical evidence supporting my judgment. Instead, I shall 
provide as an example a Supreme Court decision overturning an agency 
interpretation for which I have tremendous sympathy. 
The issue in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation86 
(the FDA Tobacco Case) was whether the FDA had exceeded its 
authority to regulate “drugs” and “drug delivery devices” when it 
promulgated rules bringing nicotine (a drug) and cigarettes and other 
tobacco products (drug delivery devices) within the ambit of the Food, 
Drug & Cosmetics Act of 1938.87 For most of the twentieth century, the 
 
 85. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at ch. 2 (explaining the inevitability of dynamic 
statutory interpretations). 
 86. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). For an excellent account of this landmark decision, 
see Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm of Agency 
Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 334 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. 
eds., 2011). 
 87. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125–31; Nicotine in Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 
44,619, 44,628–33, 44,663 (Aug. 28, 1996).  
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FDA was not only one of the most aggressive, turf-grabbing agencies, 
but also one of the most successful, its reputation as the guardian of 
American health rendering it a powerhouse that remade the country’s 
pharmaceutical industry and the practice of medicine.88 Who could not 
have admired the FDA? And when FDA Commissioner David Kessler 
(1990–97)89 went after the health-destroying tobacco industry, who could 
not be sympathetic? Indeed, at first glance, the FDA’s regulation of 
tobacco products was supported by the statute’s broad authorization and 
its health-protective purpose.  
As a rule of law matter, however, the FDA’s action was open to 
question.90 While nicotine was, arguably, a “drug” that tobacco 
manufacturers intended to alter and affect the body (through its addictive 
qualities), nicotine was unlike all the drugs previously regulated by the 
FDA. The 1938 Act contemplated that FDA-authorized drugs could only 
be prescribed for the beneficial uses allowed by the FDA and branded on 
the product;91 tobacco products always harmed the body and had no 
beneficial use, and under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) the 
agency was supposed to ban such products from the market entirely.92 
Starting in 1965, however, Congress had repeatedly enacted statutes 
regulating tobacco products through health warnings rather than through 
prohibitions and had done so only after the FDA had assured Congress 
that nicotine was not a drug and tobacco products were not drug delivery 
devices regulated under the FDCA.93  
Given the FDCA’s regulatory structure and the longstanding agency 
assurance to Congress and to the industry that nicotine was not a 
regulable drug, Commissioner Kessler’s action was a legal stretch for the 
agency, and the Supreme Court was on solid ground to enforce the legal 
structure Congress had created for drug regulation.94 The Justices would 
 
 88. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE 
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 1–15 (2010). 
 89. David A. Kessler, M.D., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/ucm113239.htm (last visited Jan. 
21, 2013). 
 90. See Richard A. Merrill, The FDA May Not Regulate Tobacco Products as 
“Drugs” or “Medical Devices,” 47 DUKE L.J. 1071 (1998) (skeptical analysis of 
Commissioner Kessler’s regulatory move by a former FDA general counsel).  
 91. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, ch. 675,  
§§ 501–05, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 to 360ddd-2).  
 92. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 135–37, 141 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f), 
(j) (2006)). 
 93. Id. at 133–43; see Merrill, supra note 90, at 1074–82 (recounting the 
statutory and legislative history of these congressional actions).  
 94. As a personal matter, I have nothing but sympathy for Justice Breyer’s 
excellent dissenting opinion, which scores many good legal points against the majority, 
but in my (reluctant) view Justice Breyer never successfully responds to the structural 
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have been acutely aware that their interpretation would be highly 
unpopular and would bring strong criticism to bear on a Court that was 
already assailed as excessively friendly to big business. The relative 
independence of the Supreme Court from political reactions and the 
Court’s relative competence in parsing statutory language and structure 
made it a potentially useful institution to enforce settled statutory 
understandings, especially those which had generated reliance interests 
by both private industry and the public sector (in this case, Congress).  
2. DEMOCRATIC SHIRKING: PROTECTING ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The Supreme Court is best situated to monitor rule-of-law shirking 
by agencies that pursue statutory purposes beyond the terms of their legal 
jurisdiction and statutory mandate. The concern with rule-of-law shirking 
is that it undermines the predictability of law and reverses assumptions 
upon which private industry and the public sector have reasonably relied. 
A related kind of shirking involves an agency’s usurpation of policy at 
the expense of the legislative process.  
Such usurpation, even for the best of reasons, is inconsistent with 
the democratic premises of Article I, Section 7: major policy decisions 
need to pass through both chambers of Congress and, usually, the 
President before they become the law of the land. The imprimatur of 
three differently constituted electorates95 guarantees a variety of 
democratic inputs into national policy decisions. When an agency such 
as the FDA makes a major policy move on its own, without sufficient 
mooring in a congressional authorization, it undercuts the democratic 
legitimacy of statutes. This was an additional reason advanced by Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor for overriding the agency in the FDA Tobacco 
Case: the Court was “confident that Congress could not have intended to 
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an 
agency in so cryptic a fashion.”96  
The Komesarian question is whether the Supreme Court is an 
institution that can reliably detect democratic shirking of this sort, 
without using that as a justification for its own overreaching. I am 
doubtful. One can certainly read the FDA Tobacco Case as an example 
of a conservative, business-friendly Court vetoing a popular regulatory 
 
argument discussed in text. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161–92 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 95. Namely, the national electorate that selects the President, the statewide 
electorates that select Senators, and the smaller district electorates that select 
Representatives.  
 96. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160. 
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move by the Clinton administration.97 That the FDA adopted its tobacco 
regulation only after extensive public feedback and debate in the media 
and in the notice-and-comment process preceding the regulation 
demonstrates that a quasi-democratic process undergirded the regulation. 
Although I consider Brown & Williamson a judicious treatment of this 
difficult issue, I am skeptical that the Court is able consistently to 
identify instances of harmful democratic shirking and to enforce any 
such rule without ideological bias. 
Nonetheless, I should not close the door on this kind of rule, 
especially if cautiously and nonideologically applied. Thus, even the 
conservative, business-loving Rehnquist Court showed its 
democracy-protecting teeth in cases where conservative Republicans 
were rebuked.98 One remarkable case was Gonzales v. Oregon,99 where 
the Rehnquist Court rebuked the Bush-Cheney administration for 
interpreting the Controlled Substances Act of 1969 to preempt Oregon’s 
aid-in-dying law.100 Although the Act delegated extensive rulemaking 
authority to the Attorney General, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion 
for the Court reasoned that the statute was focused on traditional 
concerns with drug addiction and abuse, and not with the novel use of 
drugs for a new state law permitting aid in dying.101 Like the FDA 
Tobacco Case, the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case left fundamental policy 
changes to the legislative rather than administrative process. 
3. POLICY SHIRKING: PROTECTING AGAINST BAD RULES 
Most scholars agree that agencies often produce bad rules, as a 
result of tunnel vision, interest group pressure, or simple mistakes in 
judgment.102 The Komesarian questions are whether executive branch 
 
 97. And within months after deciding the FDA Tobacco Case, the same five 
Republican-appointed Justices (Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) 
closed the door on the Democrats’ challenge to an alleged GOP vote-counting coup in the 
2000 presidential race. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (one of the most widely 
criticized Supreme Court decisions in its history). 
 98. E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 501, 534–35 (2007) (three 
Republican-appointed Justices joined two Democrat-appointed Justices to strike down the 
Bush-Cheney administration’s refusal to consider carbon dioxide as a possible pollutant, 
contrary to the apparent congressional mandate); see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 
295 tbl.4-1. 
 99. 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (Kennedy, J., for four Republican-appointed Justices 
and two Democrat-appointed Justices); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 77, at 295 
tbl.4-1.  
 100. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 248–49, 253–54, 275. 
 101. Id. at 269–74. 
 102. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and 
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002).  
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review can correct most of the mistakes agencies may make, whether 
federal courts can differentiate between the good or neutral rules and the 
bad rules, and whether courts can advance the public good (on balance) 
when they strike down agency rules. As before, I am aware of no 
systematic evidence allowing us to make any judgment on any of these 
important questions, and so I leave them open.103 Instead, consider three 
different reasons federal court review of agency rulemaking might 
produce better rules, overall, than agency rulemaking would produce on 
its own.  
To begin with, judicial review might produce better rules for an ex 
ante reason: knowing that their work product will be examined by 
another institution, agency officials ought to be more careful to include a 
variety of viewpoints and to ground their rules in defensible facts.104 In 
other words, even if judges were incompetent at differentiating between 
good rules and bad rules, judicial review could perform a useful function 
if it encouraged agencies to follow deliberative procedures that produced 
rules that can withstand critical analysis. I am quite keen on this idea, 
which is illustrated by the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case: the Department of 
Justice engaged in a secret deliberative process, limited to a small group 
of like-minded lawyers, that was inappropriate for the wide-reaching 
effect the interpretation would have had on terminally ill cancer patients, 
state experiments for treating the terminally ill, and even the practice of 
medicine.105  
On the other hand, judicial review can and often does have negative 
effects from an ex ante perspective. Knowing that their rules will be 
subject to judicial review and also knowing that judicial review tends to 
be oriented toward the status quo (as in both the Oregon Aid-in-Dying 
and FDA Tobacco Cases, as well as our earlier Case of the Vehicles), 
agencies may tend to be too cautious and to adopt rules that are not 
aggressive enough to solve the problems Congress has targeted and has 
 
 103. There is tentative evidence that OIRA review (within the executive branch) 
is strongly biased against public-regarding but affirmative regulation, at least during GOP 
administrations. See Alex Acs & Charles Cameron, Regulatory Auditing at the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) 
(http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv4/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__academics__coll
oquia__law_economics_and_politics/documents/documents/ecm_pro_073639.pdf).  
 104. Seidenfeld, supra note 102, at 543–47; cf. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, 
at 1147–48 (agency success rate at the Supreme Court is positively correlated with 
deliberative procedures, i.e., notice-and-comment rulemaking).  
 105. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Story of Gonzales v. Oregon: Death, 
Deference, Deliberation, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES, supra note 86, at 366, 
380–82 (reporting the lack of deliberation within the executive branch before the 
Attorney General issued his directive against the use of controlled substances for 
aid-in-dying purposes).  
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empowered the agency to solve.106 On yet another hand, ex ante, the 
possibility of judicial review might be a precondition for Congress to 
delegate broad rulemaking authority to agencies.  
The foregoing analysis illustrates the ultimate indeterminacy of 
much Komesarian calculus, especially when there is neither normative 
consensus nor systematic empirical knowledge upon which to ground 
institutional comparisons. Along precisely the same lines, consider the ex 
post perspective: on balance, judicial review might produce better rules 
overall, if judges trumped bad agency rules more often than they trumped 
good agency rules. How often does each kind of trumping occur?  
The answer to that question is completely indeterminate. It is often 
highly debatable whether an agency rule is “good” or “bad.” I consider 
the agency rule preempting the Oregon aid-in-dying statute to have been 
a misguided rule and so applaud the Court for overriding the agency—
but thoughtful and highly ethical officials such as Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and Office of Legal Counsel attorney Robert Delahunty 
believed it to be an exemplary rule.107 Assuming I am right about the 
virtue of the Court’s action in Oregon: How often does the Court’s 
override strike down bad agency rules? How often does the Court strike 
down good rules?  
Although I admire the legal analysis in Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
for the Court in the FDA Tobacco Case, I believe the Court struck down 
a very good rule, whereby an aggressive agency crusaded against one of 
the most tragic drugs in the history of the world. But if one takes a longer 
perspective, the Court may have struck down a good rule in pursuit of a 
better one. That is, the FDA’s regulation of tobacco products was, as 
Justice O’Connor argued, a poor fit with the FDCA’s regulatory regime, 
and the agency would probably have run into a variety of troubles if it 
had been allowed to shoehorn tobacco into that statutory scheme.108 
By striking down the agency rule, the Court stimulated a 
congressional override, the Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco 
 
 106. E.g., MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 9, at 84–105, 224–54 (making this 
argument as a critique of judicial review of auto safety rules). See generally R. Shep 
Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245,  
247–49 (1992) (arguing that process-based reversals deter agency rulemaking); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of 
Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 
308–13 (similar). 
 107. I remain deeply impressed with the thoughtfulness and deep moral 
conviction of both Ashcroft and Delahunty. See Eskridge, supra note 105, at 393–94 
(reporting the strong reasoning and deep moral conviction that Delahunty, in particular, 
brought to this issue). For the record, I filed an amicus brief at the Supreme Court level, 
urging the Court to override the Attorney General’s rule.  
 108. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142–43 (2000). 
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Control Act of 2009.109 Title I of the Act gave the FDA all the authority 
it had earlier asserted to regulate tobacco products—and then additional 
authority to ban sales of tobacco products to persons under the age of 
eighteen, to set standards for the content of tobacco products (including 
tar and nicotine levels), to register tobacco companies, and to inspect 
such companies for compliance with the law; before tobacco companies 
can introduce new products, they must secure FDA approval.110 Title II 
of the statute imposed nine new warnings for tobacco products and 
authorized the FDA to develop the details of these warnings.111  
Not only does the 2009 Act rest the FDA’s regulation of tobacco 
products upon a more secure legal and democratic foundation, but it has 
energized the agency to take even more aggressive action to regulate 
such products than even Commissioner Kessler imagined in 1996. Again, 
one might debate this point, on the ground that more than a decade 
passed before the FDA could regulate tobacco (with thousands of deaths 
and health sacrifices in the interim) and that if the FDA had prevailed in 
Brown & Williamson it would have secured congressional approval or 
acquiescence for a similar program.  
C. Public Values 
If most agency shirking reflects a Komesarian “minoritarian bias,” 
where minority insiders distort policy for their own rather than the public 
interest, some aggressive agency applications or the statute itself reflect a 
“majoritarian bias,” where majorities unfairly penalize those in the 
minority without a genuine public-regarding reason. Our system of 
government is committed to public values that protect minority 
interests,112 and the judicial branch has been the repository of this 
checking function from the beginning of our constitutional history.113 
 
 109. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.  
111–31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).  
 110. §§ 101, 901–07, 123 Stat. at 1783–1803. Some of the provisions added by 
section 101 imposed limitations on the FDA’s regulatory authority. New section 906 bars 
the FDA from banning face-to-face retail sales of tobacco products entirely or from 
requiring a doctor’s prescription to purchase these items. § 906, 123 Stat. at 1795–96. 
 111. §§ 201–06, 123 Stat. at 1842–50 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 
(Supp. V 2011)). 
 112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (positing that the limited 
governance created by the Constitution would protect minority interests against 
temporary “factions”).  
 113. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–IX (Bill of Rights, added 1791); see also id. at 
amends. XIII–XV (Reconstruction Amendments, added 1865–70), XIX (Susan B. 
Anthony Amendment, added 1920); ELY, supra note 14, at 101–06, 183 (offering a 
strong theory of judicial review that corrects for majoritarian bias); KOMESAR, supra note 
2, at 250–70 (developing the outlines of a cautious theory of judicial review to protect 
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Thus, the Federalist Papers defended not only judicial review but also 
minority-protective statutory constructions on the ground that the 
political independence of federal judges would free them to trim back 
“unjust and partial laws.”114  
Most law professors think the judicial branch seems reasonably 
well-suited for the role the Framers imagined: if any branch of 
government is going to protect minority rights against too-hasty or 
ill-motivated majority actions, it is presumably the independent judiciary. 
Not only are federal judges partially insulated from political pressure 
(and hysteria), but the case-by-case adjudicative process brings judges 
face-to-face with minority persons and factual inquiries that ought to 
bring reasons and fairness concerns to bear on contentious issues. 
Conversely, agencies are less likely to protect individuals and unpopular 
minorities; dominated by their mission and purpose and responsive to 
both (majoritarian) legislative pressure, and perhaps also (minoritarian) 
interest group pressure, agencies are more likely to make rules that run 
roughshod over individual and small group rights.115  
Hence, it is probably good for the country that the judiciary enjoys 
the power of judicial review, invalidating statutes that contravene the 
Constitution.116 Most judges and many constitutional scholars urge 
federal judges to exercise that power sparingly,117 typically for 
Komesarian reasons: if judges trump important legislative and 
 
against majoritarian bias, but without committing the judiciary to a great deal of policy 
monitoring).  
 114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., All about Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory 
Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1049–57 (2001) (situating 
Hamilton’s explanation of the judicial power in statutory cases in the context of the 
founding era debates over the judicial power).  
 115. Although a lot of law professors think this way, please notice that the 
statements in this paragraph of text are supported by no empirical evidence of which I am 
aware. 
 116. Again, most law professors think this way, but without a firm empirical 
foundation. For a counterview, with just as little empirical support, see MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (applying a thoughtful but 
nonempirical comparative institutional analysis to argue that the political process can 
enforce the essential Constitution and that the independent judiciary, on the whole, does 
not contribute positively to that process).  
 117. A leading statement of this approach to judicial review is JAMES BRADLEY 
THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 102–07 (1901). For more recent explications, along 
Komesarian lines, see KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 250–70, as well as ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
198–200 (1962); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
110–18 (2011); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 130–34, 302–09 
(1990); VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 1, 230–31, 233; and Ernest Young, Rediscovering 
Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. 
REV. 619, 635–36 (1994). 
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administrative rules, they are not only vetoing the product of a difficult 
democratic process, but they are usually going to leave a regulatory mess 
that courts have little or no capacity to remedy. One alternative to 
judicial invalidation of legislation is narrow interpretation of statutes to 
avoid “serious” constitutional problems, and a Komesarian judge might 
well construe a questionable statute narrowly, giving the political process 
an opportunity to address constitutional reservations.118  
Are there constitutional values that judges ought to be considering 
when they interpret statutes? As a matter of Supreme Court doctrine, 
there are dozens of canons of statutory construction that are grounded 
upon constitutional norms; many of them are rules requiring a clear 
statement from Congress in order to create a rule that traverses 
constitutional concerns.119 A Komesarian comparative institutional 
analysis would sharply question whether this complicated array of 
judicial trumps for legislative or administrative rules is justified by the 
relative capacity of courts to advance America’s public values. Given the 
dearth of empirical evidence and the sheer number and variety of such 
canons, one can only guess at their validity.  
The most that a comparative institutional analysis might add, 
tentatively, is the notion that courts are, relatively speaking, better at 
enforcing libertarian and process values than substantive equality and 
efficiency values. The nature of the judicial process enables judges to be 
attentive to the particular effect of broadly written statutes and 
regulations on individuals, some of whom are litigants who can tell their 
own stories. More important, judicial capacity enables judges to protect 
liberty much more easily than to promote anything more than formal 
equality: courts are pretty effective at stopping or slowing down 
government action that harms minorities, and not very effective at 
forcing government action that produces equal treatment of minorities.  
The cases I have examined in this Article illustrate these points. 
Americans enjoy a great deal of personal freedom and, apparently more 
than people in other cultures, are jealous of their liberties. Most rules 
generated by legislatures and agencies restrict our freedom to do what we 
want, and courts serve as a brake upon that regulatory impulse. In my 
view, such a brake has been most useful and workable in the arena of 
criminal law. The libertarian brake is useful for criminal law because the 
political and enforcement processes are dominated by aggressive, 
 
 118. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance 
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early 
Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 399–411 (2005). 
 119. The canons are collected in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. (4th 
ed. Supp. 2012) (reporting more than 100 Constitution-based canons deployed by the 
Rehnquist or Roberts Courts, 1986–2011).  
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put-criminals-in-jail attitudes; if any branch of government is going to 
focus on fair treatment of accused lawbreakers, it will be the judiciary. 
The libertarian brake is workable because criminal prosecutions must go 
through the judicial process, at least as a formal matter, and so a judge 
will have an opportunity to review the application of a statute (such as 
the no-vehicles law) to a particular case. Note that the libertarian 
presumption also protects noncitizens, indeed even “illegal aliens,” as 
demonstrated by the debate in Arizona v. United States.  
The libertarian presumption is typically paired with a process 
corollary: before federal courts will go along with an aggressive agency’s 
application of a regulatory statute to restrict important liberties, judges 
need to be persuaded that Congress has validated this important 
expansion of governmental authority. Thus, the normative justification 
for the rule of lenity is not just the due process (libertarian) idea that 
potential malefactors must be on notice that their contemplated conduct 
is criminal, but also (and more cogently) the process idea that only the 
legislature and not the judiciary has the moral authority to declare certain 
conduct so squalid that it is not only prohibited but is a crime against 
society.120  
The Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case illustrates the best circumstances, 
under a Komesarian analysis, for federal courts to veto an agency rule 
based upon liberty-protecting public values. To begin with, Congress had 
not targeted the issue of aid-in-dying when it enacted the Controlled 
Substances Act in 1969.121 The open-ended statutory language requiring 
a “legitimate medical purpose” for the limited use of controlled 
substances frames the debate but does not resolve it. In the last twenty 
years, Americans have become increasingly concerned about controlling 
the circumstances under which their lives will end, and aid-in-dying has 
become an important liberty, as even the cautious Rehnquist Court 
recognized.122 Finally, and most importantly, the Court was vetoing an 
 
 120. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. 
CT. REV. 345, 345–49 (advocating the retirement of the rule of lenity but also arguing 
that the nondelegation idea is the best justification for it); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., 
Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189,  
198–200 (1985) (justifying the rule of lenity along these lines). 
 121. As Justice Scalia argued in his dissent to Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 
275–85 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting), Congress delegated the Department of Justice a 
great deal of authority to implement the statute. But the dissenters’ equally heartfelt 
argument that the statute itself prohibited the use of controlled substances for 
aid-in-dying, see id. at 285–90, was far from persuasive.  
 122. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (dictum, 
recognizing a constitutional right to decline medical treatment); see Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–38 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that 
state “assisted suicide” laws are not unconstitutional on their face but that they may be an 
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agency rule that not only expanded criminal liability to a frontier area of 
medicine, and did so through a closed process with no public input 
whatsoever, but sought to close off state experimentation that offered to 
provide needed evidence regarding the operation of a proper aid-in-dying 
law. 
Contrast the FDA Tobacco Case, where the Court enforced 
libertarian baselines, but with somewhat less Komesarian justification. 
As with Ashcroft’s directive, the FDA’s tobacco regulations did affect 
liberty interests (tobacco business and individual pleasure from 
smoking), based upon a medical justification.123 Like the Department of 
Justice, the FDA was making an aggressive move to protect the health of 
the American people through a dynamic interpretation way beyond the 
expectations of the enacting Congress. So the libertarian presumption has 
some power in the FDA Tobacco Case, but with this significant 
difference: unlike the Department of Justice, the FDA adopted its 
regulation after a more open and deliberative process, with plenty of 
input from stakeholders.124 From a Komesarian perspective, this feature 
renders the FDA Tobacco Case a harder call than the Oregon 
Aid-in-Dying Case. The perspective also suggests that the Oregon 
dissenters (two of whom were key to the FDA Tobacco majority)125 were 
more motivated by their personal revulsion against “assisted suicide” 
than by analytical or doctrinal consistency. 
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS: RETHINKING CHEVRON 
The foregoing discussion suggests the utility of Professor 
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis for the proper allocation of 
statutory interpretation authority and for how each institution ought to 
carry out its duties to interpret statutes. Thus, the baseline is that 
administrative agencies will have primary authority not only for 
implementing federal statutes, but also for interpreting them. Agencies 
will carry out their duties in classic legal process fashion: they will 
choose the interpretation that best carries out the statutory purpose, so 
 
unconstitutional denial of liberty as applied to patients in great pain at the end of their 
lives, a reservation that four other concurring Justices explicitly joined).  
 123. In my view, however, the medical justification in the FDA Tobacco Case 
was stronger than the debatable justification in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying Case.  
 124. Again, the statement in text represents the conventional wisdom, but it is 
sobering to read that the FDA’s action was largely developed by Commissioner Kessler 
and the White House, and that the “public” deliberation through notice-and-comment was 
a largely Potemkin enterprise, according to Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2282–83 (2001).  
 125. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000) 
(Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in the majority opinion); Oregon, 546 U.S. at 275, 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), 299 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
2013:411 Expanding Chevron’s Domain 445 
long as it does not impose upon words a meaning they will not bear. But 
federal courts ought to remain relevant umpires when agencies are in 
dispute and ought to be second-order monitors, protecting against the 
most serious minoritizing examples of agency shirking or majoritizing 
examples of agency aggrandizement (or both, as in the Oregon 
Aid-in-Dying Case).  
How do we put all this together, doctrinally? In this final Part, I 
shall argue that a Komesarian comparative institutional analysis justifies 
a dramatic simplification of the Supreme Court’s excessively 
complicated deference doctrines. Specifically, federal courts should defer 
to all rules adopted by an agency in a public document representing the 
agency’s considered judgment, unless the agency’s rule is clearly 
contrary to the statute or to settled understandings about the statute. 
Based upon a comparative institutional analysis, the Court should 
abandon the formal regimes it has been following and should expand 
Chevron to all areas of statutory law, except criminal law (which should 
retain the rule of lenity as its baseline).  
To be clear, the comparative institutional analysis is explicitly 
normative (this is how the system ought to work) rather than doctrinal 
(this is the approach supported by the Court’s precedents). As a doctrinal 
matter, the standard work is that of Thomas Merrill, who best 
understands the Court’s precedents. His doctrinal understanding is that 
Chevron deference is justified only when an agency is applying a statute 
pursuant to lawmaking authority delegated to it from Congress.126 Merrill 
and his coauthor Kristen Hickman have also provided the classic 
doctrinal terminology for applying Chevron: Step Zero is the threshold 
inquiry, as to whether the Chevron regime kicks in; if Step Zero is 
satisfied, Step One asks whether Congress has directly addressed the 
issue; if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, Step Two requires 
courts to defer unless the agency’s interpretation is “[un]reasonable.”127  
Working within Merrill’s and the Court’s normative framework, my 
coauthor Lauren Baer and I recommended that the Court assimilate some 
of its non-Chevron deference regimes into Chevron and (if not linked to 
a lawmaking delegation) into Skidmore, the default regime.128 Under a 
 
 126. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 10, at 863–73 (justifying Chevron as an 
implied doctrine of congressional intent to delegate lawmaking authority to particular 
agencies), followed and cited in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 & n.11 
(2001); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation 
to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2171–75 (2004).  
 127. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 10, at 873 (adding the notion of a Chevron 
“[S]tep [Z]ero”—the “domain” triggering deference, to the Supreme Court’s notion of 
Step One—whether Congress has directly addressed an issue, and Step Two—whether 
the agency interpretation is reasonable). 
 128. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1184–85.  
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Komesarian analysis that approaches the deference issue without the 
constraints of the Court’s traditional approach, I would go somewhat 
further. The short version of my argument is that a comparative 
institutional analysis would justify an expansion of Step Zero (Chevron’s 
domain), would support Skidmore deference during Step One, and might 
support a procedurally more aggressive approach by judges when they 
engage in Step Two of Chevron.  
A. Chevron Step Zero: Expanded Domain for Chevron 
Under the Supreme Court’s precedents, federal courts are supposed 
to follow a wide variety of deference regimes where an agency 
interpretation is in play:129 
• Curtiss-Wright super-deference, when the statutory issue involves 
foreign affairs or national security;130 
• Seminole Rock/Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulations;131  
• Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation pursuant to a 
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the agency;132  
• Beth Israel and other statute-specific regimes deferring to agency 
interpretations of statutes they are charged with implementing;133  
• Skidmore (and uncited Skidmore Lite) deference to reasons 
provided by an agency in support of a statutory interpretation;134 
and  
• Gonzales v. Oregon antideference, when an agency interpretation 
raises serious constitutional difficulties or imposes criminal 
liability.135 
 
 129. These are surveyed in Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1099 tbl.1 
(summary chart); see id. at 1097–1136 (more in-depth explanation and empirical analysis 
for each regime).  
 130. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(leading case).  
 131. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (leading 
case); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (recent leading case).  
 132. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 230–33 (2001) 
(elaborating on Chevron, largely along lines set forth in Merrill & Hickman, supra note 
10, at 835–37).  
 133. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978) (deferring to 
NLRB interpretations that are reasonable applications of the agency’s expertise). There 
are special Beth Israel-type deference regimes for a number of other statutory arenas, but 
the Roberts Court recently overruled the special regime for tax code constructions and 
replaced it with Chevron. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 
1836, 1843–44 (2012). 
 134. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (leading case); Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. at 234–35 (important reaffirmation of Skidmore deference).  
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In an earlier empirical study, my coauthor and I found that the Court 
applies this complex regime in a haphazard manner: in a large majority 
of the cases where a formal regime is applicable, the Court does not cite 
or apply the regime.136 Indeed, notwithstanding the Court’s elaborate 
continuum of deference, and our own inventive coding of many cases as 
“Skidmore Lite” (where there was no citation of a regime but we thought 
deference was palpable), the Court in an absolute majority of cases gave 
no evidence of deference at all.137 On the other hand, agency 
interpretations prevailed in more than two-thirds of the Court’s statutory 
cases between 1984 and 2006,138 evidence that the Justices find agency 
submissions persuasive even in the tough cases taken for review. 
The normative punch line of the comparative institutional analysis 
in this Article is that agency interpretations should be the baseline for the 
modern regulatory state, for rule of law, democracy, and efficacy 
reasons. This analysis supports Justice Scalia’s longstanding campaign to 
read Chevron broadly, to encompass all interpretations officially 
announced by the agency chair or board/commission.139 Apply Occam’s 
Razor to the Supreme Court’s complicated deference continuum by 
overruling everything but Chevron, thereby creating a new baseline that 
does not even have to be cited.  
To be sure, this bold move would be contrary to the Supreme Court 
rulings that ground Chevron in the principle of congressional delegation 
of lawmaking authority.140 But that formal basis for Chevron was, as a 
formal matter, misguided from the beginning. Thomas Merrill and 
 
 135. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 263–64 (2006) (expressing reluctance to 
read the law to vest discretion in the Department of Justice to expand criminal liability); 
id. at 268–69 (expressing reluctance to vest the Department of Justice with discretion to 
apply the statute in the teeth of constitutional problems with denying any and all 
aid-in-dying). 
 136. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1100–01 (Curtiss-Wright); id. at  
1103–04 (Seminole Rock/Auer); id. at 1109–15, 1143 (Skidmore, usually completely 
unreferenced and categorized by Eskridge and Baer as Skidmore-Lite); id. at 1120–23 
(Chevron).  
 137. Id. at 1117–20.  
 138. Id. at 1100. 
 139. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 256–59 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord, 
David Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 234–57. 
 140. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 10, at 863–73 (justifying Chevron as an 
implied doctrine of congressional intent to delegate lawmaking authority to particular 
agencies), followed and cited in Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230 n.11. In earlier work, I had 
taken this basis for Chevron as axiomatic, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at  
1185–87, and I remain impressed by Professor Merrill’s legal and constitutional 
arguments in particular. The point of the current Article is that a comparative institutional 
analysis suggests the wisdom of a simplified approach—a notion that is consistent with 
Baer and my findings that the Court does not pretend to follow the formal framework 
constructed by its precedents.  
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Kathryn Tongue Watts have demonstrated that Congress has not actually 
delegated lawmaking authority in many of the cases where the Court has 
applied Chevron, including Chevron itself!141 Lauren Baer and I have 
demonstrated that the Court’s own post-Chevron precedents do not 
unwaveringly follow that precept.142 For example, Justice Breyer 
sometimes applies Chevron with a focus on reliance and the statutory 
history, with congressional delegation being a “plus” factor.143 
Thus, Chevron can be untethered from congressional delegation of 
lawmaking authority by recognizing the power of Komesarian analysis: 
as a practical matter, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and 
public purposes are best pursued through a regime that gives primacy to 
agency rulemaking, with federal courts serving important review 
functions. Moreover, largely consistent with the Court’s actual practice, 
Chevron deference should not apply to agency interpretations when (1) 
there is a clash of different governmental interpretations, as in 
preemption cases like Arizona v. United States, or when the agency 
interpretation (2) expands a criminal or punitive statute or (3) raises 
serious constitutional problems, as in cases like Gonzales v. Oregon.144 
These three exceptional situations are justified on Komesarian grounds 
by the likelihood that these are three arenas where the comparative 
advantage of courts over agencies is strongest.  
B. Chevron Step One: Skidmore Deference to Agency’s Reading of the 
Statute 
In earlier work, I urged the Court to simplify its deference 
continuum to Chevron (delegated lawmaking authority) + Skidmore (the 
residual category for other agency interpretations) + Oregon 
(antideference).145 The Komesarian analysis developed above could 
support this recommendation, but could also support the broader 
proposal for a universal Chevron, along the lines suggested by Justice 
Scalia and outlined in the previous Section. As I shall now suggest, the 
 
 141. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force 
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 587–90 (2002). 
 142. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1123–29. 
 143. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–22 (2002) (applying Chevron, but in 
light of the agency’s longstanding construction in which Congress had acquiesced).  
 144. On the consistency of the foregoing “exceptions” with the Court’s current 
practice, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1115–17 (lower win rate for agencies 
when interpretation expanded criminal liability, as it did in the Oregon Aid-in-Dying 
Case); Eskridge, supra note 65, at 1478–79 (lower win rate for agency interpretations in 
preemption cases).  
 145. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1183–90. 
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much-simplified universal Chevron approach is one that ought not render 
Skidmore irrelevant to the work of the judiciary.  
At Step One, Chevron instructs judges to determine whether the 
agency interpretation is contrary to the “unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”146 An underappreciated feature of this articulation is that, 
in figuring out whether Congress has provided an “unambiguous” answer 
to the interpretive question, the Court ought to pay close attention to the 
agency’s reasoning. In almost all of the cases where an agency offered 
the Supreme Court its own interpretation of a statute, the Solicitor 
General filed a brief laying out the agency’s reasoning.147 As a matter of 
practice, the Justices pay careful attention to the Solicitor General’s 
arguments.148 As Peter Strauss has proposed, consistent with this 
practice, the Court should announce that federal judges must give 
Skidmore deference to an agency’s reading of the statute for purposes of 
Step One.149  
The Straussian proposal makes Komesarian sense. Skidmore asks 
courts to consider whether the agency interpretation is longstanding and 
consistent and whether it reflects the agency’s expertise.150 A consistent 
and longstanding agency interpretation will have generated reliance 
interests, highly relevant for rule of law purposes. The agency’s reasoned 
explanation and the application of its expertise are relevant to a court’s 
determination whether the agency’s construction is supported by the 
statutory purpose. Although not mentioned in Skidmore, an agency’s 
account of the ongoing legislative history of the statute is also relevant at 
Chevron Step One.151 Thus, the history of an agency’s interpretation is 
strongly pertinent to a court’s determination whether Congress has 
unambiguously addressed a statutory issue.  
Undertaking Step One through the lens of Skidmore does not mean 
the agency will always prevail in hard cases, because judges should be 
attentive to an agency’s history of implementing and interpreting the 
statute and not just its current position. Recall the FDA Tobacco Case, 
where the Court ruled that Congress had already decided that 
health-impairing tobacco products fell outside the FDCA’s regulatory 
 
 146. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,  
842–43 (1984).  
 147. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 11, at 1143. 
 148. Id. at 1112–14. 
 149. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them 
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145–46 (2012).  
 150. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (factors for court to 
consider when it evaluates an agency’s interpretation).  
 151. The agency’s participation in the legislative history of a statute was 
emphasized in an important judicial harbinger of Skidmore, namely, United States v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).  
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regime.152 While the FDA in this litigation maintained that its 
interpretation was an excellent fit with the FDCA’s health-protective 
purpose,153 both Congress and the tobacco industry strongly relied on the 
agency’s previous, and longstanding, view that the FDCA did not cover 
nicotine and tobacco products.154 Starting in 1965, Congress enacted 
legislation specially regulating tobacco products; the legislative history 
of those statutes demonstrated that Congress had relied on the FDA’s 
hands-off policy to craft a series of compromises.155 Congress endorsed a 
policy where regulation was through disclosure of health risks—not the 
prophylactic measures of the FDCA.156  
Viewed functionally, through the lens of Skidmore, the specific 
tobacco-regulatory statutes were the kind of fairly settled and 
“unambiguous” congressional directive that Step One requires courts to 
enforce. Much as I lament the tobacco industry’s triumph, I appreciate 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court in Brown & Williamson as 
performing an important public function, namely, enforcement of 
statutory deals that an entire industry had relied upon for decades. To be 
sure, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion made an excellent point: the 
FDA long believed tobacco products not to be drugs because it did not 
appear that tobacco companies intended their products to affect the 
human body; once the agency discovered that the companies did actually 
intend such effects, it might plausibly consider such products to be drug 
delivery devices.157 But that discovery came long after Congress had 
hard-wired the agency’s position into the tobacco-regulatory statutes. 
And, more importantly, Justice O’Connor made a strong case for the 
proposition that the FDCA’s structure does not contemplate agency 
authorization of a drug or medical device that has no use that is not 
harmful to the body—and the one inescapable conclusion from the 
specific tobacco-regulatory statutes is that they barred the FDA from 
taking tobacco products off the market entirely.158 That, I fear, was 
Justice O’Connor’s killer argument, as to which the FDA had no 
persuasive answer.  
 
 152. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000). 
 153. Id. at 127–31. 
 154. Id. at 129–30, 157. 
 155. Id. at 137–49. 
 156. Id. at 147–48. 
 157. Id. at 172–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 158. Id. at 133–43 (O’Connor, J., for the Court).  
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C. Chevron Step Two: Deference to Agency’s Interpretation 
According to Chevron, if an agency interpretation qualifies for its 
deferential regime (Step Zero) and Congress has not directly addressed 
the issue (Step One), then courts are supposed to follow the interpretation 
so long as it is “reasonable” (Step Two).159 Few Supreme Court cases 
reject an agency interpretation at Step Two, and so almost all cases are 
resolved at Step One: if Congress has directly addressed the issue, its 
determination prevails (usually one the agency has correctly anticipated); 
if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, the agency’s 
interpretation prevails as the default interpretation.160  
The comparative institutional analysis outlined in this Article 
suggests functional virtues of the Court’s Step Two practice. The 
judiciary’s main comparative advantage is its ability to enforce the rule 
of law and jurisdictional limits upon agencies that stray from legal 
constraints, which justifies the Supreme Court’s focus on Step One. The 
agency’s main comparative advantage is policy analysis, and a 
Komesarian analyst would be loath to give judges much leeway to veto 
an agency’s policy balance, the focus of Step Two. When the policy 
issues are technical matters of economics, science, or human psychology, 
judges are at an even greater disadvantage. But consider an institutional 
twist that might enrich a judge’s examination at Step Two.  
That is, judges sometimes find the agency’s analysis unpersuasive 
or methodologically flawed. Agencies do shirk in a variety of ways, and 
sometimes judges can detect shoddy analysis of how the agency’s 
interpretation advances the statutory purposes and goals. For example, a 
zealous Parks Commission opines that tricycles are “vehicles” prohibited 
in public parks, because these are mechanisms for moving people and 
things (the dictionary definition of “vehicle”) and because the 
Commission believes that tricycles are dangerous and have sometimes 
caused accidents.  
Assume a six-year-old child is “arrested” for riding her tricycle in 
the park. The kid lawyers up and challenges the administrative 
interpretation underlying her unfortunate encounter with the state. Under 
the analysis in this Article, the Parks Commission ought to lose at every 
level of Chevron. The Commission ought to lose at Step Zero because 
the criminal penalty triggers an antideference presumption that the 
Commission cannot overcome: “vehicle” is, at best, ambiguous as 
 
 159. See Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997) (analyzing Step Two as consistent with, and 
perhaps no addition to, the APA rule that agency action must not be “arbitrary [or] 
capricious,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2012)).  
 160. E.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
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applied to tricycles, and ambiguity in criminal cases ought to be resolved 
against the prosecutor. Even without the benefit of the rule of lenity, the 
Commission probably ought to lose at Step One: the Council has 
addressed the issue through the terminology it has chosen (a conclusion 
probably supported by the legislative history, if any); most speakers 
would deem a tricycle to be a toy rather than a vehicle. Tricycles are for 
play and are a far cry from the prototypical vehicle (i.e., an automobile); 
that tricycles are usually operated by persons under the age of eight 
ought to be decisive even at Step One.  
Would the Commission also lose if it somehow got to Step Two, 
that is, assuming that the rule of lenity were inapplicable and the statute 
were ambiguous and the agency concluded that the legislative policy 
would be advanced by barring tricycles from the parks?161 Its policy 
argument would presumably be that the statutory purpose is safety and 
that tricycles are quite unsafe. The reviewing judge might think: that is 
ridiculous! In her experience, tricycles are not at all unsafe; kids might 
fall off of them and scrape their knees, but they do not pose anything like 
the safety risks of automobiles (the prototypical vehicles) or bicycles (not 
prototypical but possibly vehicles). Should the judge then reject the 
Commission’s interpretation as “unreasonable,” the applicable standard 
at Step Two?  
A Komesarian comparative institutional analysis suggests that the 
judge should not leap to overturn the agency at Step Two. An evaluation 
of the safety risks posed by tricycles is a matter where the Commission 
ought to be better informed than the judge and where the Commission’s 
judgment is more legitimate than a judge’s views. So the judge should 
think twice—and should invoke process (a judicial specialty) to resolve 
her tentative disagreement. A trial judge, of course, can set the matter 
down for a hearing and ask the Commission what evidence it has for the 
surprising notion that tricycles are dangerous.162 Have there been any 
serious accidents in any municipal park because of tricycles? Does the 
Commission know of any incident where a child suffered anything more 
than scrapes and bruises from operating a tricycle? If the Commission 
has neither evidence nor argument supporting the safety purpose, the 
reviewing court might well reject its interpretation, even under Step Two.  
 
 161. Many states have abolished the rule of lenity by statute, so that might 
leapfrog Step Zero. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 
FORD. L. REV. 885, 886 & n.9 (2004). And the Council might have provided a definition 
of “vehicle” as “any mechanism for transporting persons or things from one place to 
another.” That might create enough ambiguity to survive Step One. In such a case, the 
Commission might triumphantly claim victory at Step Two.  
 162. For video evidence of the dangers posed by tricycle riding, see Striderbikes, 
The PREbike vs. Tricycle/Training Wheels Experience, YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhHjyC-AXIE. 
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At the appellate level, judges can ask the same kinds of questions, 
but the record from the Commission and from the trial court proceedings 
might be incomplete. For issues such as this one, appeals courts might 
take judicial notice of safety evaluations of tricycles and of specific 
incidents, but if the record on appeal is unhelpful and the judges harbor 
doubts about the agency’s analysis, the court ought to consider additional 
briefing for this precise issue or a remand to the agency for fact gathering 
before it decides to reverse the agency outright. 
CONCLUSION 
The relative dearth of legal scholarship applying Professor Neil 
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis to the allocation of 
responsibility for interpreting statutes and for statutory interpretation 
methodology is unfortunate. Equally unfortunate is the shortage of 
empirical scholarship bearing on issues of institutional behavior, 
competence, and comparative competence. Notwithstanding the shortage 
of hard data, I believe the Komesarian methodology does ask the right 
questions relevant to most normative theories of statutory interpretation. 
And the methodology yields some cogent proposals for the Supreme 
Court’s Chevron legisprudence.  
Specifically, a comparative institutional analysis not only supports 
the central Chevron idea, that courts ought to defer to agencies acting 
under delegated lawmaking authority, but also supports the expansion of 
Chevron to all official and publicly available agency interpretations of 
statutes they are charged with enforcing. In other words, Komesarian 
analysis supports a dramatically expanded Chevron Step Zero, as a 
matter of proposed doctrine. Note, however, that even if the Supreme 
Court does not reconceptualize Chevron, my earlier empirical 
examination demonstrates that Komesar’s calculus better explains the 
Court’s practice than the Chevron doctrine does. The Court’s practice 
also demonstrates that the Justices are not deferential in criminal cases 
and in cases where some of them find a serious constitutional difficulty 
with the agency position.  
Additionally, comparative institutional analysis suggests that courts 
should be highly attentive to agency readings of the statute under 
Chevron Step One. If a court is certain that statutory language and 
legislative history reveal that the agency is shirking its rule of law duties, 
then the court should correct the agency. But before a court pronounces 
itself “certain” the agency is wrong, it needs to consider the agency’s 
evidence and arguments through the lens of Skidmore: Do these 
materials, and reliance interests they demonstrate, have some persuasive 
force? Do they suggest plausible readings of the statute that I had not 
considered and that better fit the statutory goals?  
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Finally, and least firmly, a Komesarian analysis suggests a residual 
role for courts even when the agency has officially interpreted an 
ambiguous statute. In other words, Chevron Step Two needs to have 
some teeth, if for no other reason than to keep agencies aware that their 
work is being monitored and, sometimes, to require further deliberation 
from the agency. 
In my view, Neil Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis is 
tailor-made for thinking about issues of agency deference—and Chevron 
reveals the importance of his kind of thinking for academic theories of 
the modern regulatory state. 
